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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
PRESTON SCOTT WALLACE, : Case No. 970552-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF THE 
VICTIMS GANG AFFILIATION. 
The State asserts that the trial court did not err in 
excluding evidence of Joseph Quintana's ("Quintana" or "Victim") 
gang affiliation. See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 11-21. The State 
argues that evidence of Quintana's gang affiliation (police records 
documenting Quintana's gang activity) is inadmissible under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 403 (1998) for primarily two reasons: 1) the 
evidence would be prejudicial, confusing and misleading because 
"nothing suggested the murder was gang-related," S.B. at 11,16-19; 
and 2) the evidence would be cumulative since similar evidence 
about Quintana's gang affiliation was already before the jury. Id. 
In focusing on these two reasons, the State loses sight of the 
relevance of the evidence and misunderstands its admissibility 
under Rule 4 03. 
As an initial matter, the State is incorrect and the trial 
court erred in concluding that the proposed evidence was 
inadmissible under Rule 403 simply because the fight was not gang-
related. In fact, Wallace does not assert that the evidence is 
admissible on that basis. 
Rather, the evidence is admissible because it goes directly to 
Wallace's "reasonabl[e] belie[f] that force [was] necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-401(1) (1995) (Utah's self-defense statute). To this end, 
Utah's self-defense statute itself expressly provides for 
consideration of "the [victim's] prior violent acts or violent 
propensities," indicating the legislature's preference for 
admissibility over exclusion. U.C.A. § 76-2-402(5)(d).1 Evidence 
1
 The trial court referenced the word "may" in § 76-2-
402(5) with regard to the subcategories of information that a 
court could consider in assessing a claim of self-defense, and 
suggested that the use of "may" meant that consideration of such 
information was optional. 
A closer reading of the statute, however, suggests 
otherwise. The statute actually states, 
In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection 
(1), the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, 
any of the following factors: (a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; (c) the probability that 
the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily 
injury; (d) the other's prior violent acts or violent 
propensities; and (e) any patterns of abuse or violence in 
the parties' relationship. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (5) (a)-(d) . The phrase, "may consider, 
but is not limited to" actually indicates that the jury should 
have at least this information (where applicable), but more if 
necessary. 
The trial court's interpretation of "may" is more 
restrictive than the context of the statute suggests. Further, 
it exemplifies the error in excluding relevant evidence of 
Wallace's self-defense claim where such evidence is contemplated 
by the self-defense statute and is necessary for Wallace to 
present a complete defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (Constitution 
guarantees each criminal defendant right to present a complete 
and meaningful defense); Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481, 1483 
(2d Cir. 1993) (restrictions on right to present complete defense 
may not be "'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they 
are designed to serve'") (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 
55-56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). 
2 
of Quintana's gang affiliation is just such evidence and 
establishes that Wallace was facing a dangerous person and, hence, 
reasonably feared for his life and physical safety when he shot 
Quintana during their altercation regardless of whether it was 
gang-related. 
The trial court nonetheless held, and the State reiterates in 
its brief, that the proposed evidence was inadmissible because it 
may have led the jury "'to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions of the case'" and was otherwise 
duplicative of similar evidence going to Quintana's gang activity. 
S.B. 16-18 (quoting State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah 
App. 1996)). See also R.611-14 (trial court's ruling on exclusion 
of evidence of Quintana's gang affiliation) 
The risk of prejudice to Quintana and the cumulative nature of 
the evidence perceived by both the trial court and the State is 
overstated. As to prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979), stated "if evidence is relevant 
and competent, the mere fact that it may be inflammatory does not 
render it inadmissible. . . . [The J]ury is entitled to know the 
truth . . . to arrive at a just verdict." Id. at 519. The truth 
of this situation is that Wallace faced an enraged gang member and, 
although the fight itself was not gang-related, Quintana had a 
propensity for violence. The jury was entitled to know this 
information in rendering its verdict in this case. In fact, 
without it, the jury was presented with an imbalanced view of the 
events leading up to Quintana's death to the extent that prior bad 
3 
act evidence came in about Wallace. See A.B. Point I.C., Point II. 
Consequently, the jury was hindered in its ability to arrive at a 
"just verdict." Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1272. 
The proposed police reports are likewise not excluded simply 
because other evidence touched on Quintana's gang affiliation. As 
noted in Wallace's opening brief ("A.B.") at Point I.B, the 
proposed evidence was the only unbiased source of information of 
its kind. A.B. 15-16. The other evidence that the State cites in 
its cumulativeness argument came from biased sources and left large 
gaps and credibility issues for the jury. A.B. 16. 
As the only unbiased source of this information, the police 
records were not cumulative. In fact, the reports were necessary 
to resolve the confusion generated by the conflicting evidence 
regarding the events leading up to the shooting. See Utah R. Evid. 
402 (1998) ("relevant evidence" is that which makes a consequential 
fact more . . . or less probable"). 
Moreover, while it is the jury's role to resolve evidentiary 
gaps and credibility issues, it should not be deprived of unbiased 
information that would make its fact-finding function easier simply 
because it could do the same job without the information if 
necessary. Indeed, such would run counter to the primary objective 
of a criminal trial: "the search for truth . . . [and] justice to 
the litigants". Slusher v. Ospital by Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, 442 
(Utah 1989); see also State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979) 
(judge must not exclude evidence if it assists jury in arriving at 
a "just verdict"). 
4 
For the foregoing reasons and the argument set forth in 
Wallace's opening brief, the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of Quintana's gang activity.2 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF WALLACE'S 
PRIOR BAD ACTS. 
A. Preservation Of The 404 (b) Issue Regarding Evidence Of 
Wallace's Attempted Marijuana Buy. 
As noted by the State, the 404(b) issue regarding evidence of 
the marijuana buy was not preserved inasmuch as the court and 
defense counsel discussed the admissibility of the evidence only in 
terms of Rule 403. S.B.24. However, this Court may nonetheless 
address the Rule 404(b) issue under the plain error doctrine. The 
plain error doctrine provides for appellate review where " (i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
[defendant]." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
In the present case, an error exists, and the trial court 
should have recognized it, to the extent that a Rule 404(b) 
challenge should have been made on the record.3 An attempted 
marijuana buy is the quintessential "bad act" contemplated by Rule 
404(b). Hence, there is no reasonable rationale, strategic or 
2
 Wallace submits on his opening brief in response to other 
assertions set forth in the State's brief, including the State's 
harmless error argument. A.B. Point I. 
3
 As noted by the State, the record suggests there was an 
off-the-record hearing regarding the matter wherein counsel 
likely raised the Rule 404(b) issue. S.B.24 (citing R.170,512-
13) . 
5 
otherwise, for omitting a Rule 404(b) challenge, especially where 
counsel clearly did raise a rule 403 objection. R.512-14; see 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (plain error rule is 
not implicated if defense counsel consciously and strategically 
elects to not raise an objection)4. 
Additionally, the error is harmful. The force of the Rule 
404(b) argument, combined with the inadmissibility argument under 
Rule 403, likely would have compelled the trial court to exclude 
such evidence. See A.B.27-29; infra Point II. B (presenting 
arguments that highlight the inadmissibility of the evidence under 
Rule 404 (b)) . 
In light of the foregoing, this Court may reach the Rule 
404(b) issue under the plain error doctrine. However, in the event 
that this Court does not do so, the evidence is nonetheless 
inadmissible under Rule 403. See A.B. 29-31. 
B. Evidence Of The Marijuana Buy Is Inadmissible Under Rule 
404(b). 
4
 Given that defense counsel raised a Rule 403 objection, 
it is apparent from the record that he did not make a strategic 
and conscious decision to allow the evidence to come in. 
Moreover, as noted supra note 3, defense counsel likely raised 
the 404(b) issue at the hearing that occurred off the record. To 
this extent, his failure to also raise a Rule 404(b) objection on 
the record did not does not arise to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 n.10 (Utah App. 
1994); see State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) ("[i]n order to bring a successful ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, appellant must show that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial")(quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984)). 
6 
Assuming that this Court does address the Rule 4 04(b) issue 
concerning the evidence of the attempted marijuana buy, Wallace 
submits on his opening brief, see A.B.27-29, in addition to the 
following points made in response to the State's brief. 
The State asserts that Wallace contested the State's 
identification evidence at trial and, therefore, the evidence of 
the marijuana buy was admissible under Rule 4 04(b) to establish 
Wallace as the perpetrator. S.B.26-27. Specifically, the State 
claims that Wallace's "strategy" to contest identity rendered the 
marijuana buy evidence admissible. S.B.26. 
The State's reasoning is flawed for a number of reasons. 
First, the State notes that Wallace put identity in issue since he 
claimed only that he shot at Quintana, not that he actually 
"wounded" him. S.B.26. Simply because Wallace contested the 
allegation that he fatally wounded Quintana does not mean that he 
contested identity.5 Indeed, in admitting that he shot at 
Quintana, Wallace conceded the identity issue. The State's failure 
to distinguish between admitting identity while denying the actual 
5
 In fact, evidence supports Wallace's case that he did not 
inflict the mortal wound: Adrianna Gonzalez reported hearing 
shots around 9:00 p.m., then hearing Quintana in his apartment 
yelling at someone in a white car around 10:00 p.m; although four 
witnesses, Armando and Adrianna Gonzalez, Rudy Lopez and Dana 
Miller, testified that they either saw or heard the fight and the 
shots, no one called an ambulance and Quintana's body was not 
found until the day after, R.434, 448-52, 541-43, 600, 626-34; no 
gun was found and the bullet retrieved from the corpse could have 
been fired from any one of over two hundred and fifty different 
weapons, and not necessarily the .380 handgun that Wallace had 
access to, R.643-44, 753[71] ; the casings found near the body, 
although .3 80 caliber, did not bear Wallace's fingerprints. 
R.436, 497, 499. 
7 
killing mischaracterizes the defense strategy and provides a 
baseless rationale for affirming the trial court's erroneous 
decision to admit such evidence under Rule 4 04(b). The State 
additionally asserts that the evidence was necessary for the 
prosecution to "strengthen" its case for identity since Wallace 
repeatedly challenged Miller's identification testimony6. S.B.27. 
However, the challenges cited by the State are taken out of 
context. Taken in their actual context, it is evident that they 
would have had no bearing on the trial court's decision to admit 
the marijuana buy evidence at that particular juncture in the 
proceeding for purposes of identity under Rule 4 04(b). 
As an initial matter, four of the six "repeated attacks," on 
Miller's testimony cited by the State occurred prior to trial which 
commenced July 15, 1997. See S.B.27 (citing R.24-43 - motion to 
suppress Miller's in-court identification, 6/6/97; R.134-35 -
amended motion to suppress Miller's identification, 6/25/97; R.175-
77, 188-89 - supplement to record on motion to suppress Miller's 
identification, 7/14/97; 752 [97-99] - pretrial foundation objection 
to Miller's identification of jacket worn by Wallace on night in 
question, 4/29/97) . At this juncture in the proceeding, they were 
6
 The State similarly suggests that Wallace's reservation 
of his opening statement also put identity in issue and justified 
the trial court's decision to admit the evidence of the marijuana 
buy. However, as discussed in his opening brief, A.B.28 n.7, 
when the court ruled to admit the evidence, it already had ruled 
that Miller could testify about her detailed account of the fight 
and the shooting. R.752[74-79]. With Miller's key testimony 
about Wallace, an identity defense was no longer viable. Hence, 
the trial court's rationale for its ruling, and likewise the 
State's rationale in its brief, e.g. "anticipat[ion]" of an 
identity defense, R.513, is unfounded. 
8 
appropriate measures taken by defense counsel in his advocacy of 
Wallace. Moreover, they were all denied. Consequently, they had 
no bearing on the State's need of the marijuana buy evidence to 
prove identity later on in the trial. 
The two remaining challenges cited by the State consisted of 
a mid-trial motion for a mistrial (R.607-08) and a post-trial 
motion to dismiss (R.746) based on inadequate identification 
evidence. As with the other challenges, these challenges had no 
bearing on the need for additional identification evidence because 
both occurred a day or two after the court's admission of the 
evidence of the marijuana. Moreover, such challenges were an 
appropriate step for defense counsel to take in his advocacy of 
Wallace. Indeed, he would be remiss if he did not do so. 
Given the timing of the challenges to Miller's identification 
testimony, the State's position that they underscored the need for 
additional evidence to establish identity is disingenuous and 
unfounded. In essence, the additional evidence of the marijuana 
buy only "strengthened" the State's case as the State itself admits 
in its brief. S.B. 27. The evidence, however, was not necessary 
to establish identity and, therefore, not admissible for that 
purpose under Rule 4 04(b). 
C. Access To A Gun Is Evidence Of "Other Crimes, Wrongs Or 
Acts" And Thus Falls Within The Scope Of Rule 404(b). 
The State asserts that Anthony Goad's testimony that he shared 
a gun with Wallace and that Wallace was carrying that gun for 
protection against unrelated gang threats, R.424-31, does not fall 
within the scope of Rule 4 04(b) because such evidence "does not 
9 
involve a crime, wrong or act . . . [and] nothing [] suggest[s] 
that defendant's mere access to the weapon was anything but legal." 
S.B.35. 
Contrary to the State's naive perception of Wallace's "mere 
access" to the gun, the evidence suggests that Wallace's carried 
the gun for anything but "legal" and socially acceptable purposes. 
As Goad testified, Wallace did not just have "mere access," S.B.35, 
to the gun. He actually carried the .38 caliber automatic two-to-
three times a week because his life had been threatened by someone 
else. R.426-29. Moreover, at the time of this incident, Wallace 
was about sixteen, a minor. R.5 (information listing Wallace's 
date of birth as 1/15/80). Under Utah law, a minor in possession 
of a firearm without the consent of his parent is guilty of at 
least a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509 (1995) 
(possession of dangerous weapon by minor). 
Given the circumstances, Wallace's access to the gun 
qualifies, at minimum, as a wrong, if not a crime, falling properly 
within the scope of Rule 404(b) . Indeed, its the very "badness" of 
the act that prompted the prosecution to seek its admission in the 
first place. Accordingly, the State's assertion that Wallace's 
"mere access" to the weapon was not a bad act is incredible and 
unfounded in the record.7 
D. Evidence Of Wallace's Access To The Gun And Attempted 
Marijuana Buy Is Inadmissible Under Rule 403. 
7
 The State does not address the admissibility of the 
evidence of the gun under Rule 404(b). Hence, Wallace submits on 
his opening brief. A.B.23-27. 
10 
The State asserts that the evidence of the attempted marijuana 
buy and Wallace's access to a handgun is admissible despite Rule 
403 proscriptions against evidence that is unduly prejudicial. 
S.B.30-34,36-39. 
The State initially challenges the "vitality" of the factors 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
291 (Utah 1988), which were addressed by Wallace in discussing the 
inadmissibility of the evidence under Rule 403. Id. at 295-96 
(outlining factors for consideration in assessing admissibility of 
prior bad act evidence under Rule 403). S.B.31. 
As an initial matter, Shickles has not been overruled. Hence, 
it has not been "abandoned" and is still "vital" for purposes of 
this appeal. S.B.31. Implicitly acknowledging the other authority 
cited by the State, Wallace notes in his opening brief that the 
Shickles factors are advisory, not mandatory, when he states, 
"[t]he admissibility of prior bad act evidence under Rule 403 takes 
into account factors such as . . . ." A.B.30. In so doing, 
Wallace sets forth the Shickles factors as a helpful guide in 
addressing this matter.8 
III. WALLACE'S CLAIM OF ERROR IN THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION HAS 
RECORD SUPPORT. 
The State claims that Wallace's argument regarding the denial 
8
 Wallace submits on his opening brief in response to the 
State's argument that the evidence of Wallace's attempted drug 
buy and his access to a handgun was admissible under Rule 403, as 
well as the State's argument that admission did not constitute 
reversible error. See A.B.29-32. Wallace's arguments under Rule 
404(b), A.B. 23-29, further highlight how the evidence was not 
probative of the issues in this case and, therefore, are unduly 
prejudicial. 
11 
of his motion for a mistrial fails for lack of record support. 
S.B.40-44. The State's claim is without merit. 
A. Wallace's Motion Was Ruled On And Is Therefore Properly 
Before This Court. 
The State initially asserts that this issue is not properly 
before this court because the statement challenged by Wallace 
during his motion for a new trial was never ruled on at the 
suppression hearing. S.B.4 0-44. Assuming but not conceding that 
Wallace did not properly challenge the statement at the suppression 
hearing, the issue is still preserved for appeal to the extent that 
the trial court ruled on the merits of Wallace's motion for a 
mistrial. In State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, cert. denied 126 
L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that an appellate 
review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial was 
proper where the trial court "addressed the issue on the merits in 
denying the motion" although the defendant had not raised the issue 
prior to his motion. Id. at 870. "Because the court considered the 
alleged error rather than finding it waived, [defendant's] right to 
assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated." Id. (citing State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991), State v.Matsamas, 808 
P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). 
In light of Seale, and to the extent that the trial court in 
this case ruled on Wallace's motion for a mistrial, denying it on 
the basis that Candland's statement was "not prejudicial" albeit 
"non-responsive," R.608, the State's preservation argument is 
without merit. Wallace's argument is therefore properly before 
this Court. 
12 
B. Wallace's Claim Of A Miranda Violation Has Record Support. 
The State additionally asserts that Wallace's claim of a 
Miranda violation fails for lack of record support. S.B.45-48. 
Again, the State's argument is without merit. 
In the first place, the trial court itself found that 
Detective Candland interrogated Wallace; that he was in cuffs and 
therefore in custody; that Candland did not administer Miranda 
warnings; and therefore ruled that Wallace's statements to Candland 
were "suppressible." R.753 [70]. Moreover, Candland's testimony 
bears out the trial court's ruling. Candland admitted that Wallace 
was cuffed when she started questioning Wallace about a green 
jacket identified by Miller as the one worn by Quintana's 
assailant. R. 753 [11]. She also admitted that she did not 
administer Miranda warnings before interrogating Wallace. Id. ; see 
also A.B.33-35 (discussing record support for custodial 
interrogation). 
In light of the above record support and contrary to the 
State's unfounded assertion, there is more than enough information 
in the record to support Wallace's claim of a Miranda violation.9 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing arguments and those set out in 
Appellant's opening brief, Wallace respectfully requests this 
9
 Wallace submits on his brief in response to the remainder 
of the State's argument regarding the trial court's erroneous 
denial of the motion for a mistrial, including the State's 
harmless error analysis. A.B.33-41. 
13 
Court to reverse the manslaughter conviction and remand for a new 
trial. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument. 
SUBMITTED this day of January, 1999. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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